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Communication and Voting with Double-Sided
Information
Ulrich Doraszelski, Dino Gerardi, and Francesco Squintani
Abstract
We analyze how communication and voting interact when there is uncertainty about
players’ preferences. We consider two players who vote on forming a partnership with
uncertain rewards. It may or may not be worthwhile to team up. Both players want
to make the right decision but differ in their attitudes toward making an error. Players’
preferences are private information and each player is partially informed about the state
of the world. Before voting, players can talk to each other.
We completely characterize the equilibria and show that the main role of communica-
tion is to provide a double check: When there is a conflict between a player’s preferences
and her private information about the state, she votes in accordance with her private
information only if it is confirmed by the message she receives from her opponent. In a
scenario where only one of the players is allowed to talk, the benefits of communication
are independent of the identity of the sender.
KEYWORDS: Deliberations, Strategic voting, Unanimity rule
1 Introduction
Two people have to decide whether to form a partnership with uncertain rewards.
In one state of the world it is worthwhile to team up, in another it is not. The
players can make two mistakes: They can either form the partnership when it is not
worthwhile to do so, or they can decide not to team up despite there being gains from
the partnership. Both players want to make the right decision but they have diﬀerent
concerns about the two errors. A player’s preferences are known to herself but not to
her opponent. Each player is partially informed about the gains of the partnership
because she receives a signal from nature that is correlated with the unknown state
of the world. The players decide about forming the partnership by voting and the
partnership is formed if both vote in its favor. Before voting, the two players can talk
to each other. This gives them an opportunity to exchange their private information
and make a more informed decision.
The essence of this scenario is the interaction of communication and voting in an
environment in which players have diﬀerent and potentially conﬂicting preferences.
One might think, for example, of two executives who have just met and hence do not
have full knowledge of each other’s attitudes. The two executives are trying to decide
whether or not to form an alliance. They must both agree in order for the alliance
to be established. Given that the beneﬁts from the alliance are uncertain and both
executives know something about the state of the world, they have a natural incentive
to talk to each other and pool the available information. Our goal is to analyze the
functions and beneﬁts of communication in situations like this.
Communication is especially important whenever a small group of people makes
a joint decision. In general, voting by itself fully aggregates information in large
elections (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997, Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998, Duggan
and Martinelli 2001, Gerardi 2000). This is not the case for small electorates. This
means that a small committee may reach a decision diﬀerent from the one that would
be made if all information were publicly available (see also Austen-Smith and Banks
(1996) and Li, Rosen and Suen (2001)).
However, whenever a small group of people needs to reach a decision, communi-
cation takes place before votes are cast. It is easy to see that communication may
help the group make a better decision if all players have the same preferences. In this
case each player has an incentive to reveal truthfully her private information and the
group thus adopts the decision that would have been preferred by everyone were all
information publicly available. In other words, information is fully aggregated once
communication is added to voting. This argument extends to the case where prefer-
ences are suﬃciently close but not identical (Austen-Smith 1990, Coughlan 2000).
It is an open question what happens when preferences diﬀer. When players diﬀer
in their attitudes toward the two errors, each has an incentive to take advantage of
the opportunity to communicate in order to manipulate the decision in the direction
of her bias. On the other hand, players also have an incentive to reveal their private
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information truthfully in order to reach a more informed decision. These opposing in-
centives lead to more complex equilibrium behavior than in the case when preferences
are similar and only the latter incentive matters.
This paper is among the ﬁrst to analyze the interaction of communication and vot-
ing when players have diﬀerent and perhaps conﬂicting preferences. In contrast to the
case of homogeneous preferences, our model allows us to gain a better understanding
of the importance of communication in a voting game.
In our analysis, we assume that preferences are private information. This is charac-
teristic of situations like partnership formation or jury deliberations in which players
do not have a long history of interactions and hence do not know each other’s atti-
tudes with certainty. Our assumption of uncertain preferences also facilitates part of
the analysis because it allows us to focus on symmetric equilibria.
We consider two related games, one in which only one player is allowed to talk
and another one in which both players are allowed to do so. We provide a complete
characterization of the equilibria in both games and show that, while not all pri-
vate information is revealed, some information transmission takes place. Our main
contribution, however, is to show how players communicate and to illustrate why
communication may be beneﬁcial.
In the scenario in which only one player talks, we start by considering the case
where the sender and the receiver have information of the same quality, i.e. the degree
of correlation between the state of the world and their signal is the same. We show
that the purpose of communication is to serve as a double check. When there is a
conﬂict between the receiver’s concern with the two errors and her private information
about the state of the world, she votes in accordance with her private information
only if it is conﬁrmed by the message she receives from the sender. On the other hand,
a sender in the same situation resolves this conﬂict by delegating the ﬁnal decision
to the receiver. She votes in favor of the alternative option and thus allows the ﬁnal
decision to depend solely on the receiver’s vote. Next we allow the two players to
have private information of diﬀerent quality. In this case it is natural to investigate
which player should assume the role of the sender. Surprisingly, the identity of the
sender is irrelevant in the sense that it does not aﬀect the quality of the ﬁnal decision.
In our model, information can be aggregated either in the communication stage or
in the voting stage. Our irrelevance result suggests that communication and voting
are “perfect substitutes”: All the information that is not transmitted by the sender’s
message is aggregated by the players’ votes.
Allowing both players to talk complicates the analysis because players are now
simultaneously senders and receivers of communication. In order to make the analysis
tractable, we assume that their information is of the same quality. Our analysis high-
lights the same functions of communication as in the one-sender game. In particular,
communication provides players with a double-check when their private information
conﬂicts with their relative concerns. To evaluate the beneﬁts of communication, we
compare players’ utilities in the one- and two-sender games with their utilities in a
2 Contributions to Theoretical Economics Vol. 3 [2003], No. 1, Article 6
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/contributions/vol3/iss1/art6
pure voting game (Gerardi 2000). A numerical example suggests that welfare is in-
creasing in the number of speakers, but also that there are decreasing returns to scale
in a certain sense.
There is an extensive literature that studies communication between informed
and interested experts and an uninformed decision maker (Crawford and Sobel 1982,
Austen-Smith 1993, Krishna and Morgan 2001a, Krishna and Morgan 2001b, Battaglini
2002). Our paper diﬀers from this literature in a crucial aspect: we study a setting
in which players are both experts and decision makers.
Endowing an informed player with decision power has important consequences for
her incentives to communicate. To see this, consider a game in which experts report
to a decision maker who, in turn, determines a course of action. Suppose that the
payoﬀs of alternatives 1 and 2 depend on the unknown state of the world. There are
two experts, and each expert observes a signal which is correlated with the state of
the world. Suppose that expert 1 truthfully reveals her signal to the decision maker
and that expert 2 and the decision maker share the same preferences. Then expert
2 also has an incentive to reveal truthfully her signal. But what happens if the two
experts have to reach a joint decision? Speciﬁcally, suppose that both experts have to
vote in favor of alternative 2 in order for it to be adopted. Continue to assume that
expert 1 is sincere. In this case, expert 2 has an incentive to send the message that
makes expert 1 more likely to vote for alternative 2. The reason is that, when expert
1 is sincere and votes for alternative 2, expert 2 possesses all the available information
and has the power to chose her favorite alternative. In sum, without voting, player
2 uses her message to help the decision maker reach an informed decision. When
there is voting, by contrast, player 2 does not need to reveal her information to the
decision maker (she is the decision maker). Thus, player 2 is free to use her message
to manipulate player 1.
Our work contributes to a small literature that investigates the interaction of
communication and voting. In a model with endogenous agenda setting, Austen-
Smith and Riker (1987) show that the available information is partially revealed
during debate. Hence, the agenda is incoherent in the sense that some agents would
like to alter their proposals after observing the proposals of the other agents. Their
model diﬀers from ours in that it employs a diﬀerent voting procedure (Condorcet
winner) and a communication scheme in which each agent sends a noisy estimate of
her private information (i.e., the agent controls the variance but not the mean of her
message).
In subsequent work, Austen-Smith (1990) considers the informational role of leg-
islative debate under exogenous as well as endogenous agenda setting. A series of
examples suggests that debate can only aﬀect the outcome of the collective decision-
making process when players’ preferences are suﬃciently similar. In Austen-Smith’s
(1990) model preferences are common knowledge. In contrast, we assume that pref-
erences are private information and show that communication always has an eﬀect
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on the ﬁnal outcome.1
More generally, this paper stands in the tradition of a growing literature that
studies the eﬀects of communication in environments where players have private in-
formation as well as decision power. In addition to voting, examples of such envi-
ronments include auctions (Campbell 1998), bargaining (Farrell and Gibbons 1989,
Matthews 1989), agenda setting (Ordeshook and Palfrey 1988), the provision of pub-
lic goods (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1991), and entry in natural-monopoly industries
(Farrell 1987, Park 2002). These papers show that communication dramatically af-
fects the set of outcomes and that its welfare eﬀects depend on the underlying game.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the one-
sender game. In Section 3 we analyze the two-sender game. Section 4 concludes and
suggests a number of possible extensions. All proofs are relegated to the appendices.
2 One-Sender Game
2.1 Model Setup and Equilibrium Concept
Two players jointly decide whether to maintain the status quo or to change it by
adopting some alternative option. Let the joint decision to maintain the status quo
be denoted by d = 1 and the decision to change it by d = 0. The rewards from the
decision depend on the unknown state of the world ω, which takes on the values 0 or
1 with equal probability.2 A decision that matches the state of the world (d = ω) is
optimal for both players, and we call such a decision correct in what follows. There
are two types of errors: adopting the alternative option (d = 0) when the state is
ω = 1 and maintaining the status quo (d = 1) when the state is ω = 0.
Players diﬀer in their relative concerns with the two errors. A player’s preferences
are formally captured by assigning her a type q ∈ (0, 1). Types are private informa-
tion, but it is common knowledge that each type is an i.i.d. draw from a distribution
F with domain (0, 1), where F is continuous, strictly increasing, and admits a density
f such that f(0+) > 0 and f(1−) > 0. A player’s utility u(d, ω, q) depends on the joint
decision d, the state of the world ω, and her type q. We normalize the utility from
making a correct decision to zero and set u(0, 0, q) = u(1, 1, q) = 0, u(0, 1, q) = −q,
and u(1, 0, q) = q − 1. Hence, higher types are more concerned with adopting the
alternative option when the correct decision is to maintain the status quo than lower
types.
Player i is partially informed about the state of the world because she receives a
signal si ∈ {0, 1} from nature which is correlated with the state of the world: Pr(si =
ω|ω) = pi ∈ (1/2, 1). If the degree of correlation between the state of the world and
their signal is the same, we say that the players have private information of the same
1We will discuss the more recent contributions by Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2002, 2003) and
Gerardi and Yariv (2003) and their relationship to our paper in Section 4.
2Our results hold also when Pr(ω = 0) = Pr(ω = 1).
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quality. Otherwise, the quality of their private information diﬀers. Conditional on
the state of the world, the signals are independent across players.
The game proceeds in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, one of the players, the sender,
expresses her opinion in the form of a straw vote. This means that the sender sends a
message m ∈ {0, 1} to her opponent, the receiver. In what follows we index variables
pertaining to the sender and the receiver by s and r, respectively. In the second stage,
player i casts her vote vi ∈ {0, 1}. The vote vi = 1 is in favor of the status quo and
the vote vi = 0 is in favor of the alternative option. Voting is simultaneous and the
decision rule prescribes that the alternative is adopted whenever both players vote for
it; otherwise the status quo is maintained. For clarity of exposition, we drop indices
in the treatment when no ambiguity arises.
The sender’s strategy consists of two choices. The message choice is described by
a function assigning to each pair (q, s) the probability that a sender of type q sends
message m = 1 after observing signal s. Her voting choice is described by a function
assigning to each triplet (q, s,m) the probability that a sender of type q votes v = 1
after she has observed signal s and sent message m. The receiver’s strategy is a
function assigning to each triplet (q, s,m) the probability that a receiver of type q
votes v = 1 when she observed signal s and received message m.
In order to characterize the equilibria of this game, we introduce so-called cutoﬀ
strategies. We say that the sender’s message strategy has a cutoﬀ structure if for any
s ∈ {0, 1}, there exists a number qs in the unit interval such that, after observing
signal s, she reports message m = 0 (m = 1) if her type q is smaller (larger) than
qs. The sender’s voting strategy has a cutoﬀ structure if for any s ∈ {0, 1} and
m ∈ {0, 1}, there exists a number qsm in the unit interval such that, after observing
signal s and sending message m, she casts the vote v = 0 (v = 1) if her type q is
smaller (larger) than qsm. Likewise, the receiver’s cutoﬀ rsm prescribes that, after
observing signal s and receiving message m, the receiver votes v = 0 if q < rsm and
v = 1 if q > rsm. In other words, ceteribus paribus high types send message m = 1
and vote v = 1 whereas low types send message m = 0 and vote v = 0.
Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) with the additional
requirement that players do not use weakly dominated strategies. In Appendix A.1,
we show that every PBE is outcome-equivalent to a PBE in which players use cutoﬀ
strategies.3 We henceforth restrict attention to PBE in cutoﬀ strategies.
Not all cutoﬀs are necessarily identiﬁed by sequential rationality or weak domi-
nance. Suppose that the sender’s cutoﬀ strategy is such that q01 < q0 and q11 < q1.
This means that after sending message m = 1 the sender vetos change. Hence, if the
receiver observes message m = 1, she knows that the sender will vote v = 1 and that
the outcome will be d = 1 irrespective of her vote. It follows that the receiver’s opti-
mal strategy is not uniquely determined. Similarly, a sender of type q > max{qs0, qs1}
3Two strategy proﬁles are outcome-equivalent if they induce the same probability distribution
over ﬁnal decisions. Note that unlike the case of voting without communication, ruling out weakly
dominated strategies does not guarantee that all equilibria admit a cutoﬀ structure.
5Doraszelski et al.: Communication and Voting
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003
knows that she will vote v = 1 after observing signal s regardless of the message she
sends. Even though her message may aﬀect the receiver’s vote, the ﬁnal decision
is d = 1. Since the sender is indiﬀerent between messages, her optimal strategy is
undetermined.
These examples suggest that an indeterminacy arises where an action does not
have an impact on the ﬁnal decision. In the case an action aﬀects the outcome, the
cutoﬀs are uniquely identiﬁed and related across signals by the family of functions
kp(q) =
q(1− p)2
q(1− p)2 + (1− q)p2 , (1)
deﬁned on (0, 1) and indexed with the quality of the signal p. Speciﬁcally, q1 = kps(q0)
and for m ∈ {0, 1}, q1m = kps(q0m) and r1m = kpr(r0m) (see proof of Proposition 1).
For future reference note that kp(q) < q for every q and p and that kp is strictly
increasing in q.
In order to resolve the indeterminacy mentioned above, we restrict attention to
PBE in which all cutoﬀs are linked across signals through the functions kps and kpr .
This requirement may be justiﬁed by noting that these PBE are the only ones that
survive a simple stability check. The idea is to ensure that a player’s action always
has an impact on the ﬁnal outcome. We achieve this by perturbing players’ voting
strategies in such a way that each player votes for change with a small but positive
probability. We then compute the sequence of best responses as this probability
vanishes and restrict attention to PBE that are the limit of such a sequence of best
responses. We call a PBE that satisﬁes this requirement robust. In Appendix A.2 we
provide a formal deﬁnition of robust equilibria and show that in a robust cutoﬀ PBE
all cutoﬀs are linked across signals through the functions kps and kpr .
In order to conduct our analysis, we pose a technical assumption on the distribu-
tion of types. For any q ∈ [0, 1], the ratio
F (x)− F (q)
F (kp(x))− F (kp(q)) (2)
is strictly decreasing in x, x ∈ [0, 1], x = q. This assumption is satisﬁed by all Beta
distributions and should thus not be considered too restrictive.
2.2 Equilibrium Characterization
This game admits diﬀerent equilibria. In so-called babbling and non-responsive equi-
libria communication plays no role: In a babbling equilibrium the sender’s choice of
message is independent of the signal she observes, in a non-responsive equilibrium
the receiver’s vote is independent of the message she receives. Non-responsive and
babbling equilibria are outcome-equivalent (see Appendix A.1) and are also outcome-
equivalent to the equilibria of the pure voting game analyzed by Gerardi (2000).
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When no communication takes place, the symmetric equilibrium is characterized by
two cutoﬀs, q˜1 and q˜0. Accordingly, the voting behavior can be classiﬁed into three
categories. Types with q < q˜1 always vote v = 0 in favor of the alternative option and
types with q > q˜0 always vote v = 1 in favor of the status quo. Finally, types with
q˜1 < q < q˜0 vote v = s according to their signal. In summary, extreme types who
are overly concerned with a particular error, vote according to their relative concerns
whereas moderate types vote according to their signal.
Our goal is to analyze the interaction of communication and voting, so it is ap-
propriate to consider responsive equilibria. In a responsive equilibrium, the receiver
conditions her vote on her type, her signal, and the sender’s message. The sender
conditions her voting strategy not only on her type and her signal, but also on the
message she sends. This is because she chooses a best reply to her opponent’s equi-
librium play which in turn changes according to the message she sends.
Next we characterize responsive equilibria in terms of conﬁgurations. By a con-
ﬁguration we mean the order of the cutoﬀs for a given signal. Although there is a
large number of conﬁgurations, Proposition 1 shows that exactly one of them is con-
sistent with a responsive PBE. This allows us to compute the responsive robust cutoﬀ
equilibria of the one-sender game by solving a system of equations (see the proof of
Proposition 1).
Proposition 1 Responsive robust cutoﬀ equilibria exist and display the conﬁguration
0 < qs < qs0 < qs1 < 1 for s ∈ {0, 1},
0 < rs1 < rs0 < 1 for s ∈ {0, 1}.
There does not exist a responsive robust cutoﬀ equilibrium in any other conﬁguration.
Fix a signal s. Proposition 1 shows that receivers with type q ∈ (0, rs1) vote
for the alternative option independent of the message they receive and receivers in
(rs0, 1) always veto change. In contrast, receivers in (rs1, rs0) vote according to the
message they receive (v = m). It follows that the receiver is (ex-ante) more likely
to vote for the alternative option after receiving a message in favor of it than after
observing a message against it. The main reason is that the sender’s signal is partially
revealed in equilibrium. In fact, in a robust PBE we have q1 = kps(q0) < q0. This
implies that a sender with type q ∈ (q1, q0) truthfully reports her signal at the message
stage (m = s). Because some senders are truthful, receiving a particular message m
strengthens the receiver’s belief that the state of the world is indeed ω = m. This
in turn increases the probability that the receiver votes according to the message
(v = m) because she would like the ﬁnal decision to match the state of the world.
Consequently, the sender can use her message to manipulate the receiver’s vote.
The sender, in turn, has to choose among three behaviors. First, she can veto
change (v = 1). Second, she can send a message in favor of the status quo but then
vote for the alternative option (m = 1 and v = 0). Third, the sender can both express
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herself and vote in favor of change (m = 0 and v = 0). The ﬁrst course of action
guarantees that the status quo persists (d = 1) independent of the sender’s message
and the receiver’s strategy. In both the second and the third course of action, the
sender in eﬀect concedes the ﬁnal decision to the receiver. On the other hand, given
the sender’s ability to manipulate the receiver’s vote, the second strategy makes the
outcome d = 1 more likely than the third one.
Proposition 1 shows that the sender’s behavior is very intuitive. High types with
q > qs1, who are very concerned with incorrectly adopting the alternative option, veto
it.4 Low types with q < qs are very concerned with mistakenly maintaining the status
quo. They therefore maximize the probability that the ﬁnal decision is to change the
status quo by targeting their actions at achieving change (m = 0 and v = 0). Lastly,
types with q ∈ (qs, qs1) are not overly concerned with a particular mistake and adopt
an intermediate behavior by sending a message in favor of the status quo but then
voting against it (m = 1 and v = 0).
A sender with type q ∈ (qs0, qs1) exhibits a rather counterintuitive feature: She re-
ports a message in favor of the status quo (m = 1) in order to increase the probability
that the alternative option is adopted (d = 0). Since q ≥ qs0, if she had sent message
m = 0, she would then vote v = 1 and the status quo would be maintained. On the
other hand, since q ≤ qs1, sending message m = 1 implies that she then votes v = 0
which, in turn, ensures that the alternative is adopted with positive probability.
Proposition 1 identiﬁes the order of the cutoﬀs for a given signal. To gain addi-
tional insights into the role of communication, we now relate players’ cutoﬀs across
signals. The exact values of the cutoﬀs q00 and q10 are irrelevant. Recall that the
threshold qs0 governs the voting behavior of senders who report message m = 0. How-
ever, provided that qs0 > qs, the voting behavior of types who send message m = 0
does not depend on the speciﬁc value of qs0. In fact, all types who send a message in
favor of change subsequently vote for it.
We have already shown in Proposition 1 that qs < qs1 and rs1 < rs0 and that
cutoﬀs are related across signals by the functions kps and kpr in a robust responsive
cutoﬀ equilibrium. Since kp(q) < q, we conclude that q1 (q01) is the smallest (largest)
cutoﬀ for the sender. Similarly, r11 (r00) is the smallest (largest) cutoﬀ for the receiver.
Therefore, it remains to determine the relationship between q11 and q0 as well as r10
and r01. Corollary 1 gives the order of these thresholds when the quality of the signal
is the same for both players. In Section 2.3, we explore the case of diﬀerent qualities.
Corollary 1 If ps = pr, then q11 < 1/2 < q0 and r10 < 1/2 < r01.
5
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 together imply the following orders of the relevant
4While these types are indiﬀerent between the two messages, a responsive PBE exists only if they
report send a message in favor of the status quo.
5In general these cutoﬀs are separated by
(
1 + Pr(ω=1)Pr(ω=0)
)−1
.
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cutoﬀs when the two players have information of the same quality:
0 < q1 < q11 < q0 < q01 < 1,
0 < r11 < r10 < r01 < r00 < 1.
Figure 1 illustrates this result. The upper part of Figure 1 summarizes the equilib-
rium behavior for diﬀerent types of senders. For each interval of types, the left (right)
column reports the equilibrium strategy of the sender when she observes signal s = 0
(s = 1). The top row indicates the sender’s message, the bottom row her vote. In
the lower part of Figure 1, we describe the receiver’s equilibrium behavior. For each
interval of types, the left (right) column refers to signal s = 0 (s = 1). The top (bot-
tom) row reports her vote after receiving message m = 0 (m = 1). To facilitate the
discussion, we give names to the senders and receivers in the ﬁve intervals. From left
to right, we label them as left extremist, left sophisticated, central, right sophisticated,
and right extremist types. We label some types sophisticated because their behavior
is fairly complex, but that does not imply that the extremist and central types are
boundedly rational. The label extremist reﬂects the fact that these types adopt a
rather inﬂexible behavior.
0                q1 q10            q11           q0             q00              q01                         1
0   0             0   1        0   1  1   1             1   1
0   0             0   0        0   1  0   1             1   1
0                r11 r10 r01                               r00                       1
0    0            0    0        0    1 0    1            1    1
0    0            0    1        0    1                   1    1            1    1
Left Extremist     Left Sophisticated Central Right Sophisticated          Right Extremist
Left Extremist     Left Sophisticated Central Right Sophisticated          Right Extremist
Figure 1: Path of play in the one-sender game. Same quality of information.
Consider the receiver ﬁrst. Left extremist receivers are so concerned with the
possibility of foregoing a valuable alternative that they vote against the status quo
(v = 0) regardless of their signal and the sender’s message. Right extremist receivers,
conversely, always enforce the status quo (v = 1). Similar to extremists, central
receivers never listen to the sender’s message. However, unlike extremists, they vote
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according to their signal (v = s). Central types are not overly concerned with either
type of error, so they have an incentive to use the available information. However,
they know that the sender may misreport her signal, and thus prefer to vote according
to their own signal.
Sophisticated receivers are the only types who may listen to the sender’s mes-
sage. Left sophisticated receivers, for example, are more concerned with mistakenly
foregoing a good opportunity for change than with the opposite mistake (but less so
than left extremists). These receivers therefore require more evidence in order to vote
for the status quo than against it. Observing signal s = 0 is suﬃcient evidence for
them that the ﬁnal decision should be to adopt the alternative option. Therefore,
left sophisticated receivers disregard the sender’s message and vote in favor of change
in this situation. Observing signal s = 1 is not conclusive, so in this case left so-
phisticated receivers require that their signal is conﬁrmed by their sender’s message
in order to vote for the status quo. Hence, left sophisticated senders vote v = 1 if
and only if their private information is in favor of change (s = 1) and that indication
is conﬁrmed by a message that is favorable to change (m = 1). Conversely, right
sophisticated receivers vote in favor of change (v = 0) if and only if their private
information and the sender’s message support this decision (s = 0 and m = 0). In
short, a sophisticated receiver uses the sender’s message as a double check. Whenever
her private information about the state of the world conﬂicts with her preferences, a
sophisticated receiver will use the sender’s message to check the validity of her own
signal and will vote according to it only if it matches the sender’s message. As far
as a player’s type may be interpreted as capturing her attitudes with respect to the
ﬁnal decision, we could say that when players have similar quality of information the
main role of communication is to resolve a conﬂict between a player’s knowledge and
her ex-ante view of the world.
Consider the sender next. A left extremist is especially concerned with maintain-
ing the status quo (d = 1) when the correct decision is to adopt the alternative option
(ω = 0). She thus votes for the alternative option (v = 0) and also sends message
m = 0 in order to manipulate the receiver to do the same. Right extremists are overly
concerned with adopting the alternative option (d = 0) when the status quo should
be maintained (ω = 1) and therefore veto change. Central senders condition their
voting and message behavior on their signal (m = v = s). Similar to central receivers,
central senders are not overly concerned with a particular mistake and thus use their
private information.
A signal in favor of change (s = 0) persuades left sophisticated senders that the
status quo should be abandoned. In this case, they express themselves in favor of the
alternative option both at the message and at the voting stage (m = 0 and v = 0).
However, after observing signal s = 1, left sophisticated senders adopt an intermediate
behavior. If they were to veto change, that would determine the ﬁnal outcome, so
they vote v = 0 just as left extremists do. However, they are not as concerned as the
left extremists about mistakenly maintaining the status quo, so they report message
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m = 1 and delegate the ﬁnal decision to the receiver. Right sophisticated senders
display analogous behavior. They adopt the intermediate strategy of sending message
m = 1 and delegating the ﬁnal decision (v = 0) after observing signal s = 0. After
observing signal s = 1, they are persuaded that the status quo should be maintained
and determine the ﬁnal outcome by vetoing change (v = 1).
Our result that a sophisticated sender delegates the ﬁnal decision to the receiver
parallels the literature on delegation. Li and Suen (2003) consider a model with a
principal and two informed experts. They show that extremist principals dictate the
ﬁnal decision whereas moderate principals delegate it to the agents.
2.3 Quality of Information
The previous section focused on the case where the quality of information is the same
for both players. If the signal qualities are diﬀerent (ps = pr), then it is no longer
true that all cutoﬀs pertaining to s = 1 are smaller than the cutoﬀs for s = 0. This
may give rise to a variety of behaviors.
From Proposition 1 we know that, independent of the signal qualities, the smallest
(largest) cutoﬀ of the sender is q1 (q01) and that the cutoﬀs q10 and q00 do not aﬀect
the equilibrium behavior on path. Analogously, r11 (r00) is the smallest (largest)
cutoﬀ of the receiver. It follows that the quality of information can aﬀect only the
relationship between q11 and q0 as well as r10 and r01. Hence, only the behavior
of central senders and central receivers can depend on the quality of information.6
Speciﬁcally, if q11 > q0, central senders send m = 1 and vote v = 0 independent of
their signal. If r10 > r01, central receivers disregard their signal and vote v = m
according to the sender’s message. Figure 2 illustrates the diﬀerent combinations
of equilibrium behavior for a uniform distribution of types. These combinations are
indicated by circles, pluses, and squares.
If the quality of information is almost the same for both players, ps ≈ pr, the
order of the cutoﬀs is q11 < q0 and r10 < r01 (pluses in Figure 2). The resulting
behavior is the same as discussed in Section 2.2. In particular, central senders and
receivers behave according to their own signal. Consider for example a central sender.
She has an incentive to use all available information which consists of her own signal
and the information contained in the receiver’s vote. While observing signal s = 1
increases the conditional probability of state ω = 1, the information contained in
the receiver’s vote either increases it (vr = 1) or decreases it (vr = 0). In order
to evaluate the information content of the receiver’s vote, the sender has to take
into account that not all types of receivers vote truthfully. Therefore, the sender
“discounts” the information content of the receiver’s vote accordingly. If the quality
of the signal is similar for both players, then the sender’s updated probability that
the state is ω = 1 is greater than 1/2 after she has observed signal s = 1 even if her
own signal conﬂicts with her opponent’s vote.
6We continue to label types from left to right.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium behavior as a function of the quality of information.
If the quality of the sender’s information is much lower than the quality of the
receiver’s information, ps  pr, then q11 > q0 and r10 < r01 (circles in Figure 2). In
this case, a poorly-informed central sender disregards her own signal and delegates
the decision to the well-informed receiver. To continue the above example, the sender
knows that the discounted information content of her opponent’s is higher than the
information content of her own signal. This is enough evidence to convince her that
the ﬁnal decision should coincide with her opponent’s vote.
If the quality of the sender’s information is much higher than the quality of the
receiver’s information, ps  pr, on the other hand, we obtain q11 < q0 and r10 >
r01 (squares). When the sender is much better informed than the receiver, central
receivers disregard their own signal and listen to the sender’s message instead.
We next consider extreme signal qualities. One might think that if the sender
has a perfect signal, then she should reveal her signal truthfully and all types of
receivers should vote according to the sender’s message. While this in fact constitutes
a responsive PBE in the limiting case of ps = 1, there are other equilibria. Our
numerical analysis highlights one of them. As the probability that the sender receives
the correct signal approaches unity, all senders are central and choose m = v = s
whereas the receivers in the interval (0, 1/2) are left extremists and the ones in (1/2, 1)
are central (and thus vote v = m for every s). Hence, the correct decision is reached in
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two diﬀerent ways. A left extremist receiver always votes v = 0 and thereby delegates
the ﬁnal decision to the sender. On the other hand, a central receiver listens to the
sender’s message and votes v = m.
If the receiver has a very good signal, pr ≈ 1, all receivers are central and choose
v = s whereas the senders in the interval (0, 1/2) are left extremists and the ones in
(1/2, 1) are central (and thus send message m = 1 and vote v = 0 for every signal s).
The sender intends to use the information available to the receiver and delegates the
decision to the receiver by voting v = 0. As the receiver disregards her message, the
sender is basically indiﬀerent between the two messages. However, a responsive PBE
requires that left extremists choose m = 0 and central types m = 1.
2.4 Welfare Analysis
So far the distinction between the sender and the receiver has been exogenous. How-
ever, as the two players may have private information of diﬀerent quality, a natural
question arises concerning the identity of the sender. Who should send the message
at the ﬁrst stage? To answer this question we consider the ex-ante utilities of the
players and the probabilities of the two possible wrong decisions (adopting d = 1
when ω = 0 and choosing d = 0 when ω = 1). In Proposition 2 we show that the
identity of the sender is irrelevant. In particular, each player has the same ex-ante
utility independent of whether she is the sender or the receiver. Similarly, the prob-
abilities of the two errors when the better informed player sends a message coincide
with the probabilities of the two errors when the sender is the player with the lower
quality signal.7
Let Γ (p, p′) denote the game in which the sender gets the correct signal with
probability p and the receiver observes the right signal with probability p′. We need
to compare sets of equilibrium utilities because we have not established uniqueness of
the equilibrium. Denote by Us (p, p
′) the set of the sender’s ex-ante responsive cutoﬀ
equilibrium utilities in the game Γ (p, p′). Similarly, let Ur (p, p′) denote the set of the
receiver’s ex-ante utilities.
Proposition 2 For any pair (p, p′) ∈ (1
2
, 1
)2
, Us (p, p
′) = Ur (p′, p).
Proposition 2 shows that, from an ex-ante point of view, the two players are
indiﬀerent between being the sender or the receiver. This result could be also obtained
by demonstrating that the set of equilibria of the game Γ (p, p′) is outcome-equivalent
to the set of equilibria of the game Γ (p′, p). Proposition 2 would then follow as a
straightforward corollary.
7Our irrelevance result can be contrasted to Dekel and Piccione (2000) who consider a sequential
voting game without communication. When players have identical preferences, they show that it is
optimal to have the better-informed players vote earlier.
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Underlying Proposition 2 is the fact that every responsive PBE (q, r) of the game
Γ (p, p′) is related to a responsive PBE (q′, r′) of the game Γ (p′, p) by
q′s = rs1, q
′
s1 = rs0, r
′
s1 = qs, r
′
s0 = qs1 for s = 0, 1.
The ﬁrst equality, for example, follows from the fact that the receiver in the game
Γ(p, p′), after observing signal s and receiving message m = 1, conditions her voting
decision on an event that has the same probability as the event on which the sender in
the game Γ(p′, p) conditions her message decision after observing signal s. Using this
symmetry result to compute Us (p, p
′) and Ur (p′, p) yields the relationship presented
in Proposition 2.
Information can be aggregated either in the communication or in the voting stage.
Proposition 2 suggests that communication and voting are “perfect substitutes” in
the sense that all the information that is not transmitted by the sender’s message
is aggregated by the players’ votes. This leads to the question of whether or not
communication is beneﬁcial at all. We defer an answer to this question to Section
3.4, where we compare a voting game without communication to the one- and two-
sender games.
3 Two-Sender Game
3.1 Model Setup and Equilibrium Concept
We now consider the case where both players participate in the straw vote. To keep
the analysis tractable, we assume that the quality of information is the same for both
players, i.e. p1 = p2 = p. Player i sends a message mi ∈ {0, 1}. The outcome of the
straw vote is common knowledge before the actual vote takes place. Hence, player i’s
voting strategy is a function assigning to each quadruplet (q, s,m,M) the probability
that player i of type q votes v = 1 after she has observed signal s, sent message m,
and received message M . Our solution concept is symmetric PBE. As in Section 2,
we rule out weakly dominated strategies.
It is easy to show that for every PBE there exists an outcome-equivalent PBE in
which the voting strategy admits a cutoﬀ representation. Even though we are not
able to establish a similar result for the message strategy, we follow the spirit of the
one-sender case and focus on symmetric cutoﬀ PBE. Such proﬁles are identiﬁed by
the cutoﬀs qs and qsmM with s ∈ {0, 1}, m ∈ {0, 1}, and M ∈ {0, 1}. This means
that a player of type q sends message m = 1 (m = 0) after observing signal s if q > qs
(q < qs), and that a player of type q votes v = 1 (v = 0) after observing signal s,
sending message m, and receiving message M if q > qsmM (q < qsmM).
As in the one-sender model, some cutoﬀs are not uniquely identiﬁed by sequential
rationality or weak dominance. We therefore restrict attention to robust equilibria in
which all cutoﬀs are related across signals through the function kp deﬁned in equation
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(1).
3.2 Equilibrium Characterization
The two-sender game admits babbling and non-responsive equilibria. It is easy to
show that symmetric non-responsive and symmetric babbling equilibria are outcome-
equivalent. With a slight abuse of terminology, we henceforth call any equilibrium
that is outcome-equivalent to a babbling equilibrium non-responsive. This includes
some responsive equilibria that are also outcome-equivalent to babbling equilibria (see
the proof of Proposition 3). This is because the ﬁnal decision is the same although
the voting strategy may be diﬀerent.
We consider responsive equilibria in order to shed light on the interaction of com-
munication and voting. In a responsive equilibrium, there are types of players who
condition their vote on their opponent’s message. In Proposition 3 we present a
complete characterization of the responsive equilibria of the two-sender game.
Proposition 3 There exist three classes of responsive robust cutoﬀ equilibria:
Class 0: qs < qs01 < qs11 < qs00 = qs10 for s ∈ {0, 1};
Class 1: qs11 < qs01 < qs < qs00 < qs10 for s ∈ {0, 1};
Class 2: qs11 < qs01 = qs < qs00 = qs10 for s ∈ {0, 1}.
There does not exist a responsive robust cutoﬀ equilibrium in any other conﬁguration.
For any class, the smallest cutoﬀ in s = 0 is larger than the largest cutoﬀ in s = 1
and the two sets of cutoﬀs are separated by 1/2. Moreover, the equilibria of class 0
are outcome-equivalent to the equilibria of class 1.
Proposition 3 shows that there are three classes of equilibria and that two of them
are outcome-equivalent. We defer a detailed discussion of the equilibrium behavior of
classes 0 and 1 and next show that equilibria in class 2 are in turn outcome-equivalent
to the equilibria of the one-sender model. Since we do not establish uniqueness, we
need to compare sets of equilibria. To facilitate this comparison, we restrict attention
to equilibria of the one-sender game in which rs0 = qs1 and rs1 = qs. Denote by E(p)
the set of outcomes induced by such robust responsive cutoﬀ equilibria of the one-
sender game. Similarly, let E2 (p) denote the set of outcomes induced by equilibria
of class 2.
Proposition 4 For any p ∈ (1
2
, 1
)
, E(p) = E2 (p).
In other words, for every equilibrium of class 2, the one-sender game admits an
outcome-equivalent equilibrium. Conversely, each equilibrium of the one-sender game
has an outcome-equivalent counterpart in class 2. This is unexpected because the
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equilibria of class 2 are symmetric and thus conceptually diﬀerent from the equilibria
of the one-sender game. In fact, while in the latter only one player communicates
any information about the state of the world, in the equilibria of class 2, both players
reveal some information. Note that it is not the case that in the equilibria of class
2 one sender babbles. Obviously, an asymmetric equilibrium of the two-sender game
can be constructed as follows. Given a responsive equilibrium of the one-sender game,
one player babbles at the message stage and chooses the same voting strategy as the
receiver. The other player behaves as if she were the sender.
The on-path behavior in the equilibrium of class 2 is similar to the behavior in a
robust responsive cutoﬀ equilibrium of the one-sender game. In particular, all types in
(0, q1) behave as left extremist senders, all types q ∈ (q100, q0) mimic central senders,
and all types in the interval (q000, 1) act as right extremist senders. Types in the
interval (q1, q100) send message m = 0 and vote v = 0 upon observing s = 0. When
the realized signal is s = 1, they send message m = 1 and then condition their vote on
the opponent’s message, voting v = 0 if and only if they receive message M = 0. Their
voting behavior coincides with the voting behavior of the left sophisticated receivers
in the one-sender game. At the same time, their message strategy is the same as the
message strategy of the left sophisticated senders. One could say that these types
combine the role of both sender and receiver. Analogously, the types in the interval
(q0, q000) play the role of right sophisticated senders and receivers.
We now turn to the equilibria of class 0 and class 1. Figure 3 illustrates the
equilibrium behavior. The top part of Figure 3 summarizes the diﬀerent paths of
play in equilibria of class 0, the bottom part refers to equilibria of class 1. For each
interval, the ﬁrst column reports the path of play of the type when she has received
the signal s = 0 from nature, and the second column, the path after the signal s = 1.
The ﬁrst row identiﬁes the message sent. The second row refers to the vote. When
a type conditions her vote on her opponent’s message, we ﬁrst present the vote after
receiving message M = 0 and second the vote after M = 1.
Since class 0 and class 1 are outcome-equivalent, we start by discussing the be-
havior implied by equilibria of class 1 and then comment on the diﬀerences between
class 1 and class 0. To facilitate the discussion, we label the types from left to right as
left extremist, left non-revealing sophisticated, left truthful sophisticated, central, right
truthful sophisticated, right non-revealing sophisticated, and right extremist types. We
now distinguish between sophisticated types who truthfully report their signal and
those who do not condition their message on their signal.
As in the one-sender game, players partially reveal their private information.
Speciﬁcally, left truthful sophisticated, central, and right truthful sophisticated types
report the signal that they observe whereas the remaining types send a message that is
independent of their signal. Turning to the voting behavior, a player is more likely to
veto change after receiving a message in favor of the status quo. Formally, qsm0 > qsm1
for all s ∈ {0, 1} and m ∈ {0, 1}. This allows a player to manipulate her opponent.
To gain insight into a player’s behavior in a PBE, let us ﬁx her opponent’s strategy
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Figure 3: Path of play of class 0 and class 1 equilibria in the two-sender game.
and her signal. The player can decide the ﬁnal outcome by voting v = 1. Alterna-
tively, she can ﬁrst send a message m ∈ {0, 1} and then vote for change irrespective of
her opponent’s message (v = 0) or vote in line with her opponent’s message (v = M).8
Suppose ﬁrst that the player observes signal s = 1. Left extremists are very
concerned with mistakenly maintaining the status quo. Therefore they send message
m = 0 in order to increase the probability that their opponent votes in favor of
the alternative option and vote v = 0 themselves. Left non-revealing sophisticated
types continue to manipulate their opponent into voting for change by falsely sending
message m = 0 but then listen to their opponent’s message and vote v = M . Left
non-revealing sophisticated types take into account that their opponent may vote
for change because they have sent a message in favor of it. Since they are less
concerned with mistakenly maintaining the status quo than left extremists, they
follow their opponent’s message at the voting stage in order to avoid that the status
quo is maintained simply because of their own message. After receiving signal s = 1,
left truthful sophisticated types are not overly concerned with a particular error and
hence have no incentive to manipulate their opponent. In fact, these types report their
signal truthfully and listen to their opponents message (v = M). Finally, central, right
truthful sophisticated, right non-revealing sophisticated, and right extremist types are
very concerned with erroneously adopting the alternative option and therefore veto
change (and send message m = 1). To summarize, low types target their actions
towards the alternative option whereas high types tend to favor the status quo.
8Since there is a positive probability that her opponent reveals her signal truthfully, it is never
optimal for the player to vote against her opponent’s message.
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Suppose next that the player observes signal s = 0. In a responsive PBE of class
1, we observe four diﬀerent behavioral patterns. Speciﬁcally, left extremist, left non-
revealing sophisticated, left truthful sophisticated, and central types disregard their
opponent’s message and express themselves in favor of change at the message and
the voting stage (m = 0 and v = 0). Right truthful sophisticated types send message
m = 0 and right non-revealing sophisticated types m = 1. However, both their votes
reﬂect their opponent’s message (v = M). Finally, right extremist types ensure that
the status quo is maintained (and send message m = 1).
Figure 3 shows that in a responsive PBE of class 1, only truthful and non-revealing
sophisticated types (left and right) make use of their opponent’s message. In partic-
ular, these types use their opponent’s message as a double check when their private
signal conﬂicts with their concerns, similar to sophisticated receivers in the one-sender
game. They vote according to their own signal only if it is conﬁrmed by their oppo-
nent’s message.
The behavior in equilibria of class 0 is the same as in equilibria of class 1 with
two exceptions. In an equilibrium of class 0, left non-revealing sophisticated types
reveal their signal and vote for change independent of their signal on their opponent’s
message. In addition, right truthful sophisticated types always send message m = 1
and then vote v = s according to their own signal.
3.3 Quality of Information
We conduct a numerical analysis with a uniform distribution of types over a grid of
values for the quality of information p. In each class, the numerical analysis led to a
unique equilibrium.
For brevity we restrict the discussion to equilibria of class 1. In Figure 4 we
present the shares of behavioral patterns for each level of quality of information. The
size of left and right extremist types decreases in p (it is close to 1 when p approaches
1/2 and it is about 0 for p near 1). The truthful sophisticated types grow steadily to
pervade the entire interval (0, 1) for p close to 1. The central types disappear for p
close to 1/2 and p close to 1. The mass of left and right non-revealing sophisticated
is relatively small.
When the quality of information is very poor, almost all players condition their
behavior only on their relative concern with respect to the two possible mistakes
and disregard both their own signal and their opponent’s message. This is an intu-
itive results, because when private signals are not informative, the whole purpose of
communication and voting to aggregate private information is deﬁed.
If the quality of information is very good, almost all players send their message
sincerely. Because of that, a player’s message contains valuable information. On
the other hand, since the player’s own signal is very informative, a conﬂict between
preferences and signal may arise even for extreme types. Therefore, almost all types
are willing to condition their voting behavior on their opponent’s opinion. In other
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Figure 4: Shares of behavioral patterns in the class 1 equilibrium as a function of the
quality of information.
words, they prefer to take advantage of the opponent’s private information as a double
check.
Finally, when the quality of the information is intermediate, there is partial revela-
tion of information. Due to the presence of extremist types, a player has to “discount”
the information content of her opponent’s message. This explains the presence of cen-
tral types who are not overly concerned with a particular mistake and thus disregard
their opponent’s message and vote according to their own signal.
3.4 Welfare Analysis
Intuitively, giving players the opportunity to talk cannot increase players’ welfare
when the signal is either completely uninformative or perfectly informative. However,
communication reveals some additional information in the case when the quality of
the signal is intermediate. This suggests that communication can increase players’
welfare in this case.
We compare players’ ex-ante equilibrium utility in the pure voting game, the one-
sender game, and the two-sender game when the distribution of types is uniform.
The result of this numerical analysis is illustrated in Figure 5, where the notation
un refers to the ex-ante utility associated with the Pareto-dominant equilibrium of
the n-sender game. The class 1 (and thus the class 0) equilibrium Pareto-dominates
the equilibrium of class 2 which in turn is outcome-equivalent to the responsive PBE
of the one-sender game. Moreover, all three classes of equilibria Pareto-dominate
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the equilibrium of the pure voting game. Our result that the ex-ante utility of all
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Figure 5: Utility comparison between the pure-voting game and the one- and two-
sender games.
players is increasing in the number of speakers is in contrast to the literature on
cheap talk originated by Crawford and Sobel (1982) where the principal’s utility, but
not necessarily an agent’s utility, is increasing in the number of agents (Krishna and
Morgan 2001b, Battaglini 2002).
The diﬀerence in utility between the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in the two-
sender game (class 1 and 0) and the equilibrium in the one-sender game is smaller than
the diﬀerence between the equilibrium in the one-sender game and the equilibrium in
the pure voting game. Since the increment of utility contributed by the ﬁrst speaker
is larger than the increment of utility contributed by the second speaker, we could
say that there is a case of decreasing returns to scale.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the interaction of communication and voting in the context of a
small committee (two players). When players share similar preferences, communica-
tion takes a very simple form since all players have an incentive to reveal their private
information (Austen-Smith 1990, Coughlan 2000). However, in many situations play-
ers do not have a long history of interactions and hence do not have full knowledge of
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each others attitudes. Therefore, we consider the case where preferences are diﬀerent
and uncertain.
We provide a complete characterization of the equilibria both for the case where
only one player is allowed to talk and for the case where both are allowed to do
so. We show that, while not all private information is revealed, some information
transmission takes place. Our main contribution is that we demonstrate how this
information transmission beneﬁts the players and helps them reach a better decision.
We show that when the two players have private information of the same quality
about the state of the world, the purpose of communication is to serve as a double
check. A player uses her opponent’s message to resolve a conﬂict between her pref-
erences and her private information. In the one-sender game the sender resolves this
conﬂict by delegating the ﬁnal decision to the receiver.
When the two players have private information of diﬀerent quality and only of
them is allowed to talk, we show that the identity of the sender does not aﬀect
the quality of the ﬁnal decision. This suggests that communication and voting are
“perfect substitutes” in the sense that all the information that is not transmitted by
the sender’s message is aggregated by the players’ votes.
To evaluate the impact of communication on players’ welfare, we compare the
voting game without communication to the one- and two-sender games. In case of
a uniform distribution of types, a numerical analysis shows that communication is
beneﬁcial and subject to decreasing returns to scale.
Our paper is a ﬁrst step toward understanding the role of communication in a
collective decision-making process. To keep the analysis tractable, we have restricted
attention to a setup with two players. Of course, a more general environment with
more than two players is necessary to analyze and compare diﬀerent voting rules.
This problem has been recently studied by Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2002, 2003)
and Gerardi and Yariv (2003). Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2002) extend our model
to the case of three players and show that our result regarding the impossibility of
a fully revealing equilibrium under the unanimity rule remains valid. Austen-Smith
and Feddersen (2003) prove a similar result for a committee of arbitrary size. In addi-
tion, Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2002) demonstrate that the majority rule induces
more information transmission and fewer erroneous decisions than the unanimity rule.
Gerardi and Yariv (2003) consider committees with three or more members and allow
for arbitrary forms of communication. They show that all voting rules that do not
require unanimous consensus are equivalent in the sense that they all produce the
same set of equilibrium outcomes. While Gerardi and Yariv (2003) characterize all
outcomes that can be implemented with communication, they do not consider the
qualitative features of the deliberation process. In this paper, we have taken a dif-
ferent approach. By studying a speciﬁc setting in which communication and voting
interact we have been able to show how players communicate.
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Appendix A: Cutoﬀ Equivalence and Robustness
A.1 Cutoﬀ Equivalence
In order to show that any PBE in undominated strategies is outcome-equivalent to
some cutoﬀ PBE, we ﬁrst need to formally deﬁne players’ strategies. The sender’s
behavioral strategy consists of two choices. The message choice is described by a
measurable function µ : (0, 1)× {0, 1} → [0, 1] where µ (q, s) denotes the probability
that the sender sends message m = 1 when her type is q and she observes signal s.
The voting choice is deﬁned by a measurable function σ : (0, 1) × {0, 1}2 → [0, 1]
where σ (q, s,m) denotes the probability that the sender votes v = 1 when her type
is q, she has observed signal s, and she has sent message m. The receiver’s strategy
is described by a measurable function ρ : (0, 1) × {0, 1}2 → [0, 1] where ρ (q, s,m)
denotes the probability that the receiver votes v = 1 when her type is q, she has
observed signal s, and she has received message m.
Associated with each strategy proﬁle is a distribution function which assigns to
each quadruplet (qs, qr, ss, sr) the probability that the decision d = 1 is made by a
sender of type qs and a receiver of type qr, when they observe signals ss and sr, respec-
tively. Two strategy proﬁles are outcome-equivalent if their associated distribution
functions are equal almost everywhere.
Proposition 5 Every PBE in undominated strategies is outcome-equivalent to a
PBE in which the sender’s message and voting strategies admit a cutoﬀ structure
described by (qs, qsm), and the receiver’s strategy admits a cutoﬀ structure described
by rsm.
Proof. In the proof we distinguish between responsive and non-responsive PBE.
An equilibrium is non-responsive if ρ (q, s, 0) = ρ (q, s, 1) for s ∈ {0, 1} and for any
q. A babbling equilibrium satisﬁes µ (q, 0) = µ (q, 1) for any q. Babbling equilibria
are non-responsive, but not necessarily vice versa.9 Moreover, any babbling PBE is
9Note that in this game there are non-responsive equilibria which are not babbling. For in-
stance, µ (q, 0) = µ (q, 1) ∈ (0, 1) for almost every q, σ (q, s, 0) = σ (q, s, 1) and ρ (q, s, 0) = ρ (q, s, 1)
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outcome-equivalent to a cutoﬀ PBE where q0 = q1 = 0. So we need to show that
non-responsive and babbling equilibria are outcome-equivalent.
Lemma 1 Non-responsive and babbling equilibria are outcome-equivalent.
This result follows from the fact that if the receiver’s voting behavior is independent
of the message, then also the sender’s voting choice (and thus the ﬁnal decision) is
independent of the message.
Turning to responsive PBE, we proceed in three steps. First we spell out the
equations that characterize the equilibrium, then we show that the set of types who
play a given strategy constitutes an interval. Finally, we show that the equilibrium
strategies admit a cutoﬀ representation.
Step 1: The equations characterizing responsive undominated PBE proﬁles ((µ, σ), ρ).
The sender’s voting strategy. Given s and m, sequential rationality requires that
σ (q, s,m) admits the following cutoﬀ structure:
σ (q, s,m) =
{
1 if q > Pr(ω = 0|s,m, vr = 0)
0 if q < Pr(ω = 0|s,m, vr = 0) (3)
Since we are restricting attention to equilibria in undominated strategies, Pr(s,m, vr =
0) > 0. Thus Pr(ω = 0|s,m, vr = 0) is well deﬁned. We deﬁne qsm = Pr(ω =
0|s,m, vr = 0), where
qsm =
Pr(s|ω = 0)Pr(vr = 0|ω = 0,m)
Pr(s|ω = 0)Pr(vr = 0|ω = 0,m) + Pr(s|ω = 1)Pr(vr = 0|ω = 1,m) (4)
The receiver’s voting strategy. Given s and m, sequential rationality requires that
ρ (q, s,m) = 1, if
q[Pr(s|ω = 0)Pr(vs = 0,m|ω = 0) + Pr(s|ω = 1)Pr(vs = 0,m|ω = 1)] > (5)
Pr(s|ω = 0)Pr(vs = 0,m|ω = 0)
and that ρ (q, s,m) = 0, if the inequality is reversed.
Whenever Pr(s|ω = 0)Pr(vs = 0,m|ω = 0)+Pr(s|ω = 1)Pr(vs = 0,m|ω = 1) > 0,
the strategy ρ (q, s,m) admits the following cutoﬀ structure:
ρ (q, s,m) =
{
1 if q > Pr(ω = 0|s,m, vs = 0)
0 if q < Pr(ω = 0|s,m, vs = 0) (6)
We deﬁne rsm = Pr(ω = 0|s,m, vs = 0).
Whenever Pr(vs = 0,m|ω = 0) = 0 (and thus Pr(vs = 0,m|ω = 1) = 0), it
follows that d = 1 regardless of ρ (q, s,m). Since the receiver is indiﬀerent between
(where σ (q, s,m) and ρ (q, s,m) are the equilibrium strategies of the game without communication)
constitutes a PBE.
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voting v = 0 and v = 1, we can construct a cutoﬀ strategy for the receiver’s voting
choice that leaves the sender’s incentives unchanged. Formally, we derive Pr(ω =
0|s,m, vr = 0, ρ) from the strategy ρ (q, s,m). By the intermediate value theorem,
there exists a rsm ∈ (0, 1) such that the cutoﬀ strategy ρ′ (q, s,m) deﬁned by rsm
yields Pr(ω = 0|s,m, vr = 0, ρ) = Pr(ω = 0|s,m, vr = 0, ρ′). This guarantees that the
sender’s voting and message strategies are unchanged.
The sender’s message strategy. Consider a sender of type q at the message stage
after she observes signal s. Let Eu(m|s, q) denote her expected utility when sending
message m. In equilibrium, the sender chooses m = 1 (m = 0) when the following
function ϕ(s, q) is positive (negative):
ϕ (s, q) := Eu (1|s, q)− Eu (0|s, q) (7)
= −q Pr (d = 0, ω = 1|s, q,m = 1)− (1− q) Pr (d = 1, ω = 0|s, q,m = 1)
+q Pr (d = 0, ω = 1|s, q,m = 0) + (1− q) Pr (d = 1, ω = 0|s, q,m = 0)
= −q Pr (ω = 1|s) [Pr (d = 0|ω = 1, s, q,m = 1)− Pr (d = 0|ω = 1, s, q,m = 0)]
− (1− q) Pr (ω = 0|s) [Pr (d = 1|ω = 0, s, q,m = 1)− Pr (d = 1|ω = 0, s, q,m = 0)]
= −q Pr (ω = 1|s) [χ (q < qs1) Pr (vr = 0|ω = 1,m = 1)
−χ (q < qs0) Pr (vr = 0|ω = 1,m = 0)]
− (1− q) Pr (ω = 0|s) [χ (q < qs0) Pr (vr = 0|ω = 0,m = 0)
−χ (q < qs1) Pr (vr = 0|ω = 0,m = 1)]
where χ (.) denotes the indicator function.
Step 2: Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to equilibria in which,
for a given signal s, the set of types who use the same strategy is an interval.
For notational ease, we denote the strategies (µ, σ) by ξ and drop s. Consider
a PBE (ξ, ρ), where there is a triple q′ < q < q′′, such that ξ(q′) = ξ(q′′), but
ξ(q′) = ξ(q). Perfection and equation (3) imply that it is impossible that σ(q) = σ(q′)
Hence, it must be that µ(q) = µ(q′). Without loss of generality, we may assume that
µ(q) and µ(q′) are two diﬀerent pure strategies. (If µ(q) or µ(q′) is mixed, then there
exists a PBE (ξ′, ρ) in which the types q′ and q use diﬀerent pure message strategies,
types q′ and q′′ use the same strategy, and the other types of sender maintain ξ.)
Since ξ is an equilibrium strategy, it follows that type q′ prefers to play ξ(q′) rather
than ξ(q). This implies that:
−q′ Pr(d = 0, ω = 1|ξ(q′))− (1− q′) Pr(d = 1, ω = 0|ξ(q′)) ≥
−q′ Pr(d = 0, ω = 1|ξ(q)) + (1− q′) Pr(d = 1, ω = 0|ξ(q))
and
−q′′ Pr(d = 0, ω = 1|ξ(q′))− (1− q′′) Pr(d = 1, ω = 0|ξ(q′)) ≥
−q′′ Pr(d = 0, ω = 1|ξ(q)) + (1− q′′) Pr(d = 1, ω = 0|ξ(q)).
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By linearity of the above expression, the strategy ξ(q) is optimal for type q if and
only if
Pr(d = 0, ω = 1|ξ(q′)) = Pr(d = 0, ω = 1|ξ(q))
Pr(d = 1, ω = 0|ξ(q′)) = Pr(d = 1, ω = 0|ξ(q)) (8)
which implies that the senders q, q′ and q′′ must be indiﬀerent between ξ(q) and ξ(q′).
Since by equation (3) σ(q) ∈ {0, 1} a.e, it suﬃces to consider four diﬀerent cases.
Case 1: Suppose that µ(q′) = µ(q) and that on-path σ(q) = 0 and σ(q′) = 1.
Then Pr(d = 0, ω = 1|ξ(q′)) = 0 but Pr(d = 0, ω = 1|ξ(q)) > 0 since after any message
the receiver may vote v = 0 with positive probability. This is a contradiction.
Case 2: Suppose that µ(q′) = µ(q) and that on-path σ(q) = 1 and σ(q′) = 0.
Then Pr(d = 0, ω = 1|ξ(q′)) > 0 but Pr(d = 0, ω = 1|ξ(q)) = 0, which is again a
contradiction.
Case 3: Suppose now that on-path σ(q) = 0 and σ(q′) = 0. Using equation (8),
we have
Pr (d = 1, ω = 0|ξ (q′)) = Pr (ω = 0|s) Pr (vr = 1|ω = 0, µ (q′)) (9)
= Pr (ω = 0|s) [pr Pr (vr = 1|µ (q′) , sr = 0) + (1− pr) Pr (vr = 1|µ (q′) , sr = 1)]
= Pr (ω = 0|s) [pr Pr (vr = 1|µ (q) , sr = 0) + (1− pr) Pr (vr = 1|µ (q) , sr = 1)]
= Pr (d = 1, ω = 0|ξ (q))
Note that if the set of sender’s types who send message µ(q′) and vote v = 0 on
path has measure zero, then we can ﬁnd a PBE (ξ′, ρ) in which types qˆ < q who
were using strategy ξ(q′) switch to strategy ξ′(qˆ) = ξ(q) and all other types of sender
maintain strategy ξ. Similarly, if the set of sender’s types who send message µ(q)
and vote v = 0 on path has measure zero, then there exists a PBE in which all
types qˆ ∈ (q′, q′′) who were using strategy ξ(q) adopt strategy ξ(q′). Finally, consider
the case in which both sets deﬁned above have positive measure. Then equation (5)
implies that r0µ(q) > r0µ(q′) if and only if r1µ(q) > r1µ(q′). It follows that equation (9)
can hold only if the equilibrium is not responsive.
Case 4: Suppose that on-path σ(q) = 1 and σ(q′) = 1. Then there exists a PBE
in which types qˆ ∈ (q′, q′′) who were using strategy ξ(q) adopt strategy ξ(q′), similarly
to case 3.
This concludes the proof of the second step. We have shown that for any equilib-
rium, we can ﬁnd an outcome-equivalent equilibrium where the set of types who take
the same strategy is an interval. Moreover, the argument may be extended to show
that if such an interval is of positive measure, the associated message strategy must
be a pure strategy. If not, for any pair of type (q, q′) in the interval, both q and q′
must be indiﬀerent between sending message m = 0 or m = 1. Also, given the same
message, type q votes as type q′. Together with condition (7), this implies that the
equilibrium must be non-responsive.
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Step 3: For any PBE in undominated strategies, there is an outcome-equivalent
equilibrium in which the sender’s message strategy can be characterized by a cutoﬀ.
Let Qmv denote the interval of sender’s types who send message m and vote v
(on-path). Suppose there exists a PBE with Q00 = (a, b) and Q01 = (c, d), where
0  a  b < c  d  1. Depending on the relationship of Q10 and Q11, we consider
three diﬀerent cases.
Case 1: Q10 = (b, e) and Q11 = (e, c) for some e ∈ [b, c).
Types q ∈ Q01 are indiﬀerent between sending message m = 0 and m = 1 because
on-path they will vote v = 1 and achieve d = 1 in both cases. Therefore, there is
an outcome-equivalent equilibrium where all types in Q01 adopt the same strategy as
the types in Q11 and the receiver’s strategy is unchanged.
Case 2: Q10 = (b, c) and Q11 = (d, 1).
There is an outcome-equivalent equilibrium where all types in Q11 adopt the same
strategy as the types in Q01, so this case is outcome-equivalent to Q10 = (b, c) and
Q01 = (c, 1). It remains to show that there is an outcome-equivalent equilibrium
where all the types in Q01 play m = 1 and v = 1. That is guaranteed when qs1 ≤ c.
Proceeding by contradiction, suppose c < qs1. Note that ϕ(s, q) deﬁned in equation
(7) must be equal to zero at q = c. Solving ϕ(s, c) = 0 yields an expression for c that
coincides with the RHS of equation (4) with m = 1. This implies that c = qs1, and a
contradiction is obtained.
Case 3: Q10 = (0, a) and Q11 = (b, c).
There is an outcome-equivalent equilibrium where all types in Q01 adopt the same
strategy as the types in Q11, so this case is outcome-equivalent to Q10 = (0, a) and
Q11 = (b, 1). To complete the argument, note that the reduced conﬁguration derived
in Case 3 is the meaning reversion of the reduced conﬁguration derived in Case 2.
A.2 Robustness
To provide a formal deﬁnition of our robustness requirement in the one-sender game,
we characterize an agent in terms of her action and, if applicable, also in terms of
the message sent or received. The sender thus has three agents, one at the message
stage and two at the voting stage (depending in the message sent). We let µ denote
the strategy of the agent at the message stage, where µ(q, s) is the probability that
the agent sends message m = 1 when her type is q and she observes signal s. σm
denotes the strategy of the sender’s agent at the voting state after receiving message
m ∈ {0, 1}, where σm(q, s) is the probability that the agent votes v = 1 when her
type is q and her signal is s. The receiver has two agents. Let ρm(q, s) denote the
probability that the agent who receives message m ∈ {0, 1} votes v = 1 when her
type is q and her signal is s.
For any ε ∈ (0, 1) and any m ∈ {0, 1}, deﬁne the strategies σεm and ρεm as follows:
σεm (q, s) = (1− ε)σm (q, s) ,
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ρεm (q, s) = (1− ε) ρm (q, s) .
These strategies guarantee that each agent votes for change with probability at least
ε. For any collection of strategies (µ, σ0, σ1, ρ0, ρ1), we let BR (µ, σ0, σ1, ρ0, ρ1) be the
set of best response proﬁles.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium (µ, σ0, σ1, ρ0, ρ1) is robust if there exists a sequence
{εn}n0 converging to zero such that there exists a sequence (µ, σn0 , σn1 , ρn0 , ρn1 ) that
belongs to the set BR (µ, σεn0 , σ
εn
1 , ρ
εn
0 , ρ
εn
1 ) and converges weakly to (µ, σ0, σ1, ρ0, ρ1).
We now show that in any robust cutoﬀ PBE, all cutoﬀs are related across signals
by the functions kps and kpr as explained in Section 2.1.
Lemma 2 In any robust cutoﬀ PBE, q1 = kps(q0) and for any m ∈ {0, 1}, q1m =
kps(q0m) and r1m = kpr(r0m).
Proof. Consider the sender’s agent at the voting state after receiving message m.
Along the sequence of perturbed strategies the probability that the receiver’s agent
votes v = 0 is strictly positive. Therefore the sender’s agent vote is pivotal. This, in
turn, implies that the agent’s best response is a cutoﬀ strategy and that the cutoﬀ is
uniquely determined. Formally, the voting cutoﬀ when the agent observes signal s is
equal to:
qnsm =
1
1 + Pr(ω=1|s)
Pr(ω=0|s)
(
Prn(vr=0|ω=1,m)
Prn(vr=0|ω=0,m)
) ,
where Prn(vr = 0|ω,m) is the probability, computed along the sequence, that the
receiver’s agent after message m votes v = 0 when the state of the world is ω. A
similar argument can be used to show that all receiver’s agents use cutoﬀ strategies
and to establish the relationship between the receiver’s cutoﬀs.
We now turn to the sender’s message cutoﬀs. Let Prn (vs = 0|s, q,m) denote the
probability, computed along the sequence, that the sender’s agent after message m
votes v = 0 when her type is q and her signal is s. It is easy to check that for any
m ∈ {0, 1} the following equality holds:
Prn (vs = 0|s = 0, q,m) = Prn (vs = 0|s = 1, kps (q) ,m) .
It follows that if (µn, σn0 , σ
n
1 , ρ
n
0 , ρ
n
1 ) belongs to the set BR (µ, σ
εn
0 , σ
εn
1 , ρ
εn
0 , ρ
εn
1 ) then
µn(q, 0) = µn(kps(q), 1) (see equation (7) in the proof of Lemma 1). This implies that
the cutoﬀ equilibrium cannot be robust if q1 is not equal to kps (q0).
The concepts and results of this section extend mutatis mutandis to the two-sender
game.
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Appendix B: Proofs
In the proofs we shall often refer to the odds ratio (1 − pi)/pi, which we denote by
Ri. We will make use of the family of functions
kR(q) =
R2q
R2q + 1− q
deﬁned on q ∈ (0, 1) and indexed with R ∈ (0, 1). Note that for every q and R,
kR(q) < q and kR is strictly increasing in q. kR is straightforwardly derived from kp
since R = (1− p)/p.
Proof of Proposition 1. We start by deriving the equations that characterize
all robust responsive cutoﬀ equilibria. We then check which order of the cutoﬀs is
consistent with equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, we proceed in two steps. The ﬁrst one rules
out all conﬁgurations that are inconsistent with equilibrium. The second step shows
that a robust cutoﬀ PBE indeed exists for the conﬁguration presented in Proposition
1.
Sender’s voting strategy. After restricting attention to robust cutoﬀ equilibria,
equations (4), which characterize the sender’s equilibrium voting strategy, simplify
to: 

q00 =
1
1+Rs
[RrF (r00)+F (r10)]
[F (r00)+RrF (r10)]
q10 =
1
1+ 1
Rs
[RrF (r00)+F (r10)]
[F (r00)+RrF (r10)]
q01 =
1
1+Rs
[RrF (r01)+F (r11)]
[F (r01)+RrF (r11)]
q11 =
1
1+ 1
Rs
[RrF (r01)+F (r11)]
[F (r01)+RrF (r11)]
(10)
Receiver’s voting strategy. Given m, rsm is uniquely deﬁned by equation (6) when-
ever Pr(vs = 0,m) > 0. In this case we obtain after simpliﬁcation:

r00 =
1
1+Rr
[Rs min{F (q0),F (q00)}+min{F (q1),F (q10)}]
[min{F (q0),F (q00)}+Rs min{F (q1),F (q10)}]
r10 =
1
1+ 1
Rr
[Rs min{F (q0),F (q00)}+min{F (q1),F (q10)}]
[min{F (q0),F (q00)}+Rs min{F (q1),F (q10)}]
(11)


r01 =
1
1+Rr
[Rs(F (q01)−F (q0))+(F (q11)−F (q1))]
[(F (q01)−F (q0))+Rs(F (q11)−F (q1))]
r11 =
1
1+ 1
Rr
[Rs(F (q01)−F (q0))+(F (q11)−F (q1))]
[(F (q01)−F (q0))+Rs(F (q11)−F (q1))]
(12)
In a robust cutoﬀ PBE, Pr(vs = 0,m = 0) > 0. Hence, rs0 is uniquely deﬁned. If
Pr(vs = 0,m = 1) = 0, then the characterizing equations for rs1 are undetermined.
However, Lemma 2 in Appendix A.2 implies that r01 = kRr(r11) in a robust cutoﬀ
PBE.
Step 1: The only conﬁguration consistent with equilibrium is qs < qs0 < qs1 for
s ∈ {0, 1}.
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Since cutoﬀs are related across signals by the strictly increasing functions kRs and
kRr , it suﬃces to consider the ordering of the cutoﬀs for a given signal.
In any responsive cutoﬀ equilibrium, we have rs0 > rs1. (If rs0 = rs1, the equi-
librium is nonresponsive. Moreover, in any responsive equilibrium, we have qs > 0.
But if rs0 < rs1, then one can show by inspecting equation (7) that there are senders
of type q, with q suﬃciently close to 0, who have an incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium strategy and send message m = 1.) By equation (10) and our technical
assumption, rs0 > rs1 if and only if qs0 < qs1. It remains to check conﬁgurations that
involve qs0 < qs1.
Case 1: Suppose that qs0 < qs1 ≤ qs. Then ϕ(s, q) ≤ 0 for q ∈ (qs0, qs1) since
these types prefer to send message m = 0. However, ϕ is strictly decreasing in this
interval and has a zero at qs1 (see equation (10)). This implies a contradiction.
Case 2: Suppose we have an equilibrium where qs0 < qs < qs1. Under this conﬁg-
uration, the function ϕ(s, q) in equation (7) is strictly decreasing for q ∈ (qs0, qs1) and
ϕ(s, qs) = 0. However, inspecting equation (10), we have ϕ(s, qs1) = 0 which implies
a contradiction.
Case 3: Suppose that qs = qs0 < qs1. We want to show that there are senders of
type q ∈ (0, qs0) who have an incentive to deviate from their equilibrium strategy and
send m = 1. Consider the function ϕ from equation (7). This function is piecewise
linear. We extend the segment deﬁned on (0, qs0) to the unit interval to obtain the
following function:
ϕˆ (s, q) = −q Pr (ω = 1|s) [Pr (vr = 0|ω = 1,m = 1)− Pr (vr = 0|ω = 1,m = 0)]
− (1− q) Pr (ω = 0|s) [Pr (vr = 0|ω = 0,m = 0)− Pr (vr = 0|ω = 0,m = 1)]
Note that ϕˆ (s, q) is strictly increasing with ϕˆ (s, 0) < 0 and ϕˆ (s, 1) > 0. Hence, it
attains a unique zero in (0, 1). It thus suﬃces to show that ϕˆ(s, q) has its zero in
(0, qs0).
Let qˆs be the zero of ϕˆ(s, q), where
qˆs =
1
1 + Pr(ω=1|s)[Pr(vr=0|ω=1,m=0)−Pr(vr=0|ω=1,m=1)]
Pr(ω=0|s)[Pr(vr=0|ω=0,m=0)−Pr(vr=0|ω=0,m=1)]
From equation (4) we know that
qs0 =
1
1 + Pr(ω=1|s) Pr(vr=0|ω=1,m=0)
Pr(ω=0|s) Pr(vr=0|ω=0,m=0)
A simple calculation shows that qˆs ≥ qs0 implies
Pr(vr = 0|ω = 1,m = 0)
Pr(vr = 0|ω = 0,m = 0) ≤
Pr(vr = 0|ω = 1,m = 1)
Pr(vr = 0|ω = 0,m = 1)
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But qs1 > qs0 rules out the above inequality.
We conclude that a robust responsive cutoﬀ PBE can exist only if qs < qs0 <
qs1. The next step is to show that there indeed exists an equilibrium with this
conﬁguration.
Step 2: There exists a robust responsive cutoﬀ PBE.
The following system characterizes the equilibrium with qs < qs0 < qs1:

q0 =
1
1+Rs
[Rr(F (r00)−F (r01))+(F (kRr (r00))−F (kRr (r01)))]
[(F (r00)−F (r01))+Rr(F (kRr (r00))−F (kRr (r01)))]
q00 =
1
1+Rs
[RrF (r00)+F (kRr
(r00))]
[F (r00)+RrF (kRr
(r00))]
q01 =
1
1+Rs
[RrF (r01)+F (kRr
(r01))]
[F (r01)+RrF (kRr
(r01))]
r00 =
1
1+Rr
[RsF (q0)+F (kRs
(q0))]
[F (q0)+RsF (kRs
(q0))]
r01 =
1
1+Rr
[Rs(F (q01)−F (q0))+(F (kRs (q01))−F (kRs (q0)))]
[(F (q01)−F (q0))+Rs(F (kRs (q01))−F (kRs (q0)))]
(13)
It is enough to spell out the equations for s = 0 because the cutoﬀs for s = 1 can be
recovered from the cutoﬀs for s = 0 using the functions kRr and kRs .
Since q00 does not appear in the equations for the other cutoﬀs, it suﬃces to show
that the system above admits a solution with r00 > r01 and q01 > q0. To see this, note
that if r00 > r01, then ϕ(s, q) is strictly increasing for q ∈ (0, qs0) and it has a zero at
qs. Moreover, ϕ(s, q) is strictly decreasing for q ∈ (qs0, qs1) and has a zero at qs1. For
q > qs1, ϕ(s, q) = 0. This implies that the cutoﬀ message strategy described by qs is
a best reply. Finally, applying our technical assumption to the above system implies
that if qs1 > qs, then qs0 ∈ (qs, qs1).
For the moment consider the case in which Rs = Rr = R. We express the working
hypothesis that there is a solution such that rs0 = qs1 and rs1 = qs. Therefore, we
just need to ﬁnd a solution that satisﬁes q01 > q0 for the system:

q01 = h1(q01,q0) :=
1
1+R
[RF (q0)+F (kR(q0))]
[F (q0)+RF (kR(q0))]
q0 = h2(q01, q0) :=
1
1+R
[R(F (q01)−F (q0))+(F (kR(q01))−F (kR(q0)))]
[(F (q01)−F (q0))+R(F (kR(q01))−F (kR(q0)))]
Consider the function h = (h1, h2) deﬁned on X = {(x, y) ∈ (0, 1)2 : x > y}. For
any (x, y) ∈ X, our technical assumption implies that h1(x, y) > h2(x, y). Moreover,
h1(x, y) ∈ (0, 1) and h2(x, y) ∈ (0, 1), so the function h maps X into X.
Denote by X¯ the closure of X. We now construct a continuous extension h˜ : X¯ →
X¯ of h. First note that h˜1(x, y) = h1(x, y) is a continuous function on X¯\{(x, 0) :
x ∈ [0, 1]}. Using De L’Hopital rule, we deﬁne h˜1(x, 0) = limy→0 h1(x, y) for any x.
(Recall that h1(x, y) is independent of x. Hence, limy→0 h1(x, y) is independent of x.)
Secondly, h˜2(x, y) = h2(x, y) is a continuous function on X¯\{(y, y) : y ∈ [0, 1]}. We
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again use De L’Hopital rule to deﬁne
h˜2(y, y) = lim
x→y
h2(x, y) =
1
1 + R [Rf(y)+f(k(y))k
′(y)]
[f(y)+Rf(k(y))k′(y)]
for any y.
h˜ is continuous. Our technical assumption implies that h˜2(y, y) < h˜1(y, y) for any
y. Moreover, h˜1(x, 0) ∈ (0, 1), h˜2(x, 0) ∈ (0, 1), and h˜2(1, y) ∈ (0, 1). This implies
that h˜ : X¯ → X ⊂ X¯. Hence, by Brouwer’s Fixed-Point Theorem, there must exist
a pair (x, y) ∈ X such that h(x, y) = h˜(x, y) = (x, y).
When Rs = Rr, it is no longer the case that rs0 = qs1 and rs1 = qs. Nevertheless,
the above argument can be generalized by considering a function h = (h1, h2, h3, h4)
on X = {(x, y, w, v) ∈ (0, 1)4 : x > y,w > v}, where hj denotes the RHS of the jth
equation in system (13).
It is easy to check that the equilibrium is robust.
Proof of Corollary 1. We show that Rs = Rr = R implies q11 < 1/2 < q0 and
r10 < 1/2 < r01. To show this it suﬃces to demonstrate that the smallest cutoﬀ for
s = 0 is larger than the largest cutoﬀ for s = 1.
Each cutoﬀ associated with signal s = 0 has a representation
1
1 + RPr(ω=1)[RA+B]
Pr(ω=0)[A+RB]
where A,B ∈ (0, 1). Such an expression is strictly larger than 1
1+
Pr(ω=1)
Pr(ω=0)
, the lower
bound obtained by setting A = 0 and B = 1. Each cutoﬀ associated with signal s = 1
has a representation
1
1 + 1
R
Pr(ω=1)[RA+B]
Pr(ω=0)[A+RB]
Such an expression is strictly smaller than 1
1+
Pr(ω=1)
Pr(ω=0)
, the upper bound obtained by
setting A = 1 and B = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let qs, qsm, and rsm be an arbitrary proﬁle of
equilibrium cutoﬀs of the game Γ (p, p′). By inspecting the equations in system (13)
it is easy to check that Γ (p′, p) admits a responsive equilibrium with cutoﬀs q′s, q
′
sm,
and r′sm satisfying:
q′s = rs1, q
′
s1 = rs0, r
′
s1 = qs, r
′
s0 = qs1 for s = 0, 1. (14)
Denote by us (p, p
′) the sender’s ex-ante utility associated with the proﬁle (qs,
qsm, rsm) and by ur (p, p
′) the receiver’s ex-ante utility. Similarly, denote by us (p′, p)
and ur (p
′, p) the sender’s and receiver’s ex-ante utility associated with the proﬁle (q′s,
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q′sm, r
′
sm). Straightforward calculations yield:
us (p, p
′) =
1
2
{
∫ q0
0
[p((1− p′)(1− F (r10)) + p′(1− F (r00)))(q − 1)
+(1− p)(p′F (r10) + (1− p′)F (r00))(−q)]f (q) dq
+
∫ q01
q0
[p((1− p′)(1− F (r11)) + p′(1− F (r01)))(q − 1)
+(1− p)(p′F (r11) + (1− p′)F (r01))(−q)]f (q) dq +
∫ 1
q01
p(q − 1)f (q) dq
+
∫ q1
0
[(1− p)((1− p′)(1− F (r10)) + p′(1− F (r00)))(q − 1)
+p(p′F (r10) + (1− p′)F (r00))(−q)]f (q) dq
+
∫ q11
q1
[(1− p)((1− p′)(1− F (r11)) + p′(1− F (r01)))(q − 1)
+p(p′F (r11) + (1− p′)F (r01))(−q)]f (q) dq +
∫ 1
q11
(1− p)(q − 1)f (q) dq}
ur (p
′, p) =
1
2
{
∫ r′01
0
[p((1− p′)(1− F (q′11)) + p′(1− F (q′01)))(q − 1)
+(1− p)(p′F (q′11) + (1− p′)F (q′01))(−q)]f (q) dq
+
∫ r′00
r′01
[p((1− p′)(1− F (q′1)) + p′(1− F (q′0)))(q − 1)
+(1− p)(p′F (q′1) + (1− p′)F (q′0))(−q)]f (q) dq +
∫ 1
r′00
p(q − 1)f (q) dq
+
∫ r′11
0
[(1− p)((1− p′)(1− F (q′11)) + p′(1− F (q′01)))(q − 1) + p(p′F (q′11)
+(1− p′)F (q′01))(−q)]f (q) dq
+
∫ r′10
r′11
[(1− p)((1− p′)(1− F (q′1)) + p′(1− F (q′0)))(q − 1)
+p(p′F (q′1) + (1− p′)F (q′0))(−q)]f (q) dq +
∫ 1
r′10
(1− p)(q − 1)f (q) dq}
The equality us (p, p
′) = ur (p′, p) follows by substituting equations (14) in the above
expressions. By the same token, the equality ur (p, p
′) = us (p′, p) is established.
Proof of Proposition 3. As indicated in Appendix A.2, in any robust PBE
the order of the cutoﬀs is the same for s = 0 and s = 1 since cutoﬀs are related across
signals by the strictly increasing function kR. This allows us to focus on the cutoﬀs
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for one of the two signals. The proof proceeds in a number of steps. We ﬁrst rule out
all conﬁgurations which are inconsistent with an equilibrium and then show that the
remaining three conﬁgurations admit an equilibrium.
In the remainder of the proof we shall make use of the following equations. Let
V denote the opponent’s vote. Consider the message cutoﬀ ﬁrst. It is optimal for a
player of type q to send m = 1 if φ(s, q) = Eu(1|s, q)− Eu(0|s, q) ≥ 0, where
φ (s, q) = −q Pr (ω = 1|s) [χ (q < qs10) Pr (V = 0,M = 0|ω = 1,m = 1) (15)
−χ (q < qs00) Pr (V = 0,M = 0|ω = 1,m = 0)
+χ (q < qs11) Pr (V = 0,M = 1|ω = 1,m = 1)
−χ (q < qs01) Pr (V = 0,M = 1|ω = 1,m = 0)]
− (1− q) Pr (ω = 0|s) [χ (q < qs00) Pr (V = 0,M = 0|ω = 0,m = 0)
−χ (q < qs10) Pr (V = 0,M = 0|ω = 0,m = 1)
+χ (q < qs01) Pr (V = 0,M = 1|ω = 0,m = 0)
−χ (q < qs11) Pr (V = 0,M = 1|ω = 0,m = 1)]
Consider the voting cutoﬀs next. In a cutoﬀ PBE, there is a strictly positive proba-
bility that a player is pivotal after receiving message M = 0. Therefore, the voting
cutoﬀs for s ∈ {0, 1} and m ∈ {0, 1} are uniquely identiﬁed and equal to
qsm0 =
1
1 + Pr(ω=1|s)
Pr(ω=0|s)
[Rmin{F (q0),F (q00m)}+min{F (kR(q0)),F (kR(q00m))}]
[min{F (q0),F (q00m)}+Rmin{F (kR(q0)),F (kR(q00m))}]
:= g1(min{qs, qs0m})
(16)
On the other hand, a player may not be pivotal after observing message M = 1.
However, if there is a positive probability that the player is pivotal, then the voting
cutoﬀs for s ∈ {0, 1} and m ∈ {0, 1} are uniquely identiﬁed and equal to
qsm1 =
1
1 + Pr(ω=1|s)
Pr(ω=0|s)
[R(F (q01m)−F (q0))+(F (kR(q01m))−F (kR(q0)))]
[(F (q01m)−F (q0))+R(F (kR(q01m))−F (kR(q0)))]
:= g2(qs1m, qs) (17)
Our technical assumption guarantees that g1 is strictly decreasing in its argument
and that g2 is strictly decreasing in both its arguments. (Note that g2 is deﬁned only
for qs1m = qs.)
Step 1: In any responsive robust equilibrium, qs < qs10.
Inspecting equation (15), we note that a necessary condition for equilibrium is
that for at least one signal s ∈ {0, 1} we have
min{F (qs), F (qs00)}+ max{F (qs10)− F (qs), 0}
≥ min{F (qs), F (qs01)}+ max{F (qs11)− F (qs), 0} (18)
Otherwise a player with type q suﬃciently close to 0 would strictly prefer to send the
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message m = 1.
Suppose by contradiction that qs10 ≤ qs. Equation (18) becomes
min{F (qs), F (qs00)} ≥ min{F (qs), F (qs01)}+ max{F (qs11)− F (qs), 0} (19)
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: qs01 ≥ qs. Equation (19) implies that qs00 ≥ qs and qs11 ≤ qs. Equation
(16) then yields qs10 = qs = qs00. Wrapping up we obtain qs11 ≤ qs10 = qs = qs00 ≤ qs01.
While this conﬁguration allows for equilibria, these equilibria are outcome-equivalent
to equilibria of the game without communication. Speciﬁcally, whenever q > qs,
the player will choose m = 1 and v = 1 irrespective of her opponent’s message and
whenever q < qs, the player will always choose m = 0 and vote v = 0.
Case 2: qs01 < qs. Equation (16) implies that qs00 < qs. Otherwise we would have
qs00 = g1(qs) and qs10 = g1(qs01). But since g1 is decreasing, qs00 < qs10 ≤ qs and we
would then have a contradiction.
Equation (18) becomes F (qs00) ≥ F (qs01) +max{F (qs11)−F (qs), 0}. Thus qs00 ≥
qs01. Together with qs > qs00 this implies qs10 = g1(qs01) and qs00 = g1(qs00). Since g1
is strictly decreasing, we obtain qs10 ≥ qs00. We need to distinguish two subcases.
Subcase 1: qs00 = qs10. Thus qs01 = qs10 = qs00 < qs. Since qs01 = qs00,
max{F (qs11) − F (qs), 0} = 0, i.e., qs11 ≤ qs. While equilibria exist in this conﬁgura-
tion, they are outcome-equivalent to the equilibria of the pure voting game. Whenever
q < qs00, the player will choose m = 0 and v = 0 independently of her opponent’s
message and whenever q > qs00, the player will always vote v = 1.
Subcase 2: qs00 < qs10. Since qs10 = g1(qs01) and qs00 = g1(qs00), this implies
qs01 < qs00. Suppose ﬁrst that qs11 > qs. For q > qs10 the function φ(s, q) is strictly
decreasing and has a zero at qs11. Therefore the conﬁguration qs01 < qs00 < qs10 <
qs < qs11 does not constitute an equilibrium since types q ∈ (qs10, qs) prefer to deviate
from their equilibrium message strategy and send m = 1. Suppose next that qs11 ≤ qs.
For q ∈ (qs00, qs10) the function φ(s, q) is strictly decreasing and has a zero at qs10.
Thus the conﬁguration qs01 < qs00 < qs10 < qs and qs11 ≤ qs is not an equilibrium
since types q ∈ (qs00, qs10) have an incentive to deviate and send message m = 1.
Step 2: In any responsive robust equilibrium, qs00 ≤ qs10.
Suppose by contradiction that qs00 > qs10. Then qs00 > qs10 > qs by Step 1.
Hence, qs00 = g1(qs) and qs10 = g1(min{qs, qs01}) which implies qs00 ≤ qs10 since g1 is
decreasing.
Step 3: In any responsive robust equilibrium, qs ≤ qs00.
By contradiction, suppose that qs00 < qs. Then qs00 < qs < qs10 by Step 1. Since
qs00 = g1(qs00) and qs10 = g1(min{qs, qs01}), the previous inequality implies qs01 < qs00.
So we obtain that qs01 < qs00 < qs < qs10. This leaves us with qs11. We now show
that there does not exist a robust PBE irrespective of qs11.
Suppose ﬁrst that qs11 < qs. In the interval (max{qs00, qs01, qs11}, qs10) the function
φ(s, q) is strictly decreasing and it has a zero at qs10. Therefore types in the inter-
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val (max{qs00, qs01, qs11}, qs) have an incentive to deviate from the candidate equilib-
rium strategy and send message m = 1. Next assume that qs = qs11. In the interval
(qs00, qs10) the function φ(s, q) is strictly decreasing and it has a zero at qs10. Therefore
types q ∈ (qs00, qs) deviate by sending message m = 1. Finally suppose that qs11 > qs.
In the interval (qs00,min{qs11, qs10}) the function φ(s, q) is strictly decreasing. Hence,
it cannot be negative on (qs00, qs) and positive on (qs,min{qs11, qs10}) and there cannot
be an equilibrium.
To summarize, so far we have concluded that
qs ≤ qs00 ≤ qs10 and qs < qs10.
This allows for three possibilities: qs01 may be strictly smaller, equal, or strictly larger
than qs. In the remainder of the proof we show that the only equilibrium conﬁguration
in which qs01 > qs is class 0, the only equilibrium conﬁguration with qs01 < qs is class
1, and the only one with qs01 = qs is class 2.
Step 4: The only robust responsive equilibrium conﬁguration with qs01 > qs is
class 0.
Since qs01 > qs, we have qs00 = g1(qs) = qs10. The relationship between qs00 and
qs01 determines three cases.
Case 1: qs10 = qs00 < qs01. Equation (18) implies that qs10 ≥ qs11. Therefore,
the function ϕ(s, q) is strictly increasing in the interval (qs10, qs01) and it has a zero
at qs01. Consequently, types q ∈ (qs00, qs01) deviate from the candidate equilibrium
strategy and send message m = 0.
Case 2: qs10 = qs00 = qs01 > qs. This implies qs00 = g1(qs) = g2(0, qs) and
qs01 = g2(qs10, qs). Since g2 is strictly decreasing in the ﬁrst argument and qs10 > qs,
it follows that qs00 > qs01, a contradiction.
Case 3: qs10 = qs00 > qs01 > qs. There are four possibilities determined by the
position of qs11. Suppose ﬁrst that qs11 ≤ qs. In the interval (qs, qs01) the function
φ(s, q) is strictly increasing and it has a zero at qs01. Types in this interval thus want
to deviate from the candidate equilibrium strategy and send message m = 0. Assume
next that qs11 ∈ (qs, qs01]. Since qs01 = g2(qs10, qs) and qs11 = g2(qs11, qs) and g2 is
strictly decreasing in its ﬁrst argument, this would imply qs01 < qs11, a contradiction.
Finally, suppose that qs11 ≥ qs10. Since qs11 = g2(qs11, qs) ≤ g2(qs10, qs) = qs01 < qs10,
we obtain a contradiction.
We are left with the conﬁguration
qs < qs01 < qs11 < qs00 = qs10
All these cutoﬀs are uniquely identiﬁed by equations (15) and (16).10 This candidate
is in fact an equilibrium conﬁguration and we denote it as class 0. By inspecting the
φ(s, q) function, we observe that it is strictly increasing and it has a zero on (0, qs01).
10This implies that all cutoﬀs associated with signal s = 0 (s = 1) are above (below) 1/2.
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This in turn identiﬁes qs. φ(s, q) is strictly decreasing on (qs01, qs11), it has a zero at
qs11, and it is constant and equal to zero for q ≥ qs11. In order to show the existence
of an equilibrium of class 0, it suﬃces to show that the system of equations (15) and
(16) admits a solution that satisﬁes the above conﬁguration. The existence proof is
a straightforward extension of the existence proof for one-sender game and is thus
omitted.
It is easy to show that the equilibrium is robust.
Step 5: The only responsive robust equilibrium condition in which qs01 < qs is
class 1.
Note that qs01 < qs implies qs00 < qs10. Moreover, we have qs11 < qs10. Otherwise,
since qs11 = g2(qs11, qs) ≤ g2(qs10, qs) = qs01 < qs10, we would obtain a contradiction.
The relationship between qs and qs00 yields two cases.
Case 1: qs00 = qs. Depending on the position of qs11 there are two possibilities.
First assume that qs11 ≤ qs. In the interval (qs01, qs00) the function φ(s, q) is strictly
increasing and it has a zero at qˆ = g2(qs, qs01) < g2(qs, 0) = g1(qs) = qs00. Therefore,
types in (max{qˆ, qs01}, qs00) prefer to deviate at the message stage and send m = 1.
Assume next that qs11 ∈ (qs, qs10). We have qs11 = g2(qs11, qs) < g2(0, qs) = g1(qs) =
qs00 = qs, a contradiction.
Case 2: qs00 > qs. There are three possibilities depending on the position of
qs11. First suppose that qs11 ∈ [qs00, qs10). We have qs11 = g2(qs11, qs) < g2(0, qs) =
g1(qs) = qs00, a contradiction. Suppose next that qs11 ∈ (qs, qs00). For q ∈ (qs11, qs00)
the function φ(s, q) is strictly increasing and it has a zero at qˆ = g2(qs, qs01) >
g2(qs, qs11) = qs11. Therefore, types in (qs11,min{qˆ, qs00}) prefer to deviate at the
message stage and send m = 0.
We are left with the conﬁguration
qs01 < qs < qs00 < qs10 and qs11 ≤ qs.
This conﬁguration will lead us to the equilibrium of class 1. In fact, the function
φ(s, q) is strictly increasing and always negative on (0, qs01) and strictly increasing
on (qs01, qs00) with a zero in the interior of that interval. Moreover, φ(s, q) is strictly
decreasing and always positive on (qs00, qs10) and it is zero for any q ≥ qs10. Finally,
the system of equations (15)-(17) has a solution that respects the above conﬁguration
(the proof is again a straightforward extension of the proof for the one-sender game).
Notice that the voting cutoﬀ qs11 is undetermined. However, along the sequence
of perturbed strategies the cutoﬀ qs11 is given by
qs11 =
1
1 + Pr(s|ω=1)
Pr(s|ω=0)
Pr(m=1|ω=1)
Pr(m=1|ω=0)
= g2(1, qs),
and thus in any robust equilibrium qs01 = g2(qs10, qs) > g2(1, qs) because g2 is decreas-
ing in both arguments. The remainder of the proof that the equilibrium if class 1 is
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robust is simple and therefore omitted.
Step 6: The only responsive robust equilibrium condition in which qs01 = qs is
class 2.
The equality qs01 = qs immediately implies qs00 = g1(qs) = g1(qs01) = qs10. More-
over, we have already shown that qs10 > qs. Depending on the position of qs11 there
are three cases to consider.
Case 1: qs11 ≥ qs10. Then qs11 = g2(qs11, qs) ≤ g2(qs10, qs) = qs01 < qs10, a
contradiction.
Case 2: qs11 ∈ (qs, qs10). In the interval (0, qs) the function φ(s, q) is strictly
increasing function and it has a zero at qˆ = g2(qs10, qs11) < g2(qs, qs11) = qs. Hence,
types in (qˆ, qs) deviate from the equilibrium by sending m = 1.
Case 3: We are left with the conﬁguration
qs11 ≤ qs = qs01 < qs00 = qs10
which will lead us to the the equilibrium of class 2. The function φ(s, q) is strictly
increasing and always negative on (0, qs01) and is identically equal to zero for q ≥ qs01.
The existence proof is identical to the existence proof for the one-sender game after
setting Rs = Rr = R, imposing r
1
s0 = q
1
s1 and r
1
s1 = q
1
s , and relabeling qs01 = q
1
s and
qs10 = q
1
s1, where the superscript 1 denotes the one-sender game cutoﬀs.
Again, qs11 is not determined by the equilibrium conditions. However, robustness
implies that qs11 = g2 (1, qs) > g2(qs10, qs) = qs01 = qs.
Finally, we show that equilibria of class 0 are outcome-equivalent to equilibria
of class 1. Given a class 0 equilibrium (q0s , q
0
smM), it is easy to show by inspecting
the equations that characterize the equilibria that there exists a class 1 equilibrium
(q1s , q
1
smM) such that
q0s = q
1
s01, q
0
s11 = q
1
s , q
0
s10 = q
1
s10
The above equalities and the fact the the cutoﬀs q1s11, q
1
s00, and q
0
s01 are irrelevant for
the outcome imply that the two equilibria are outcome-equivalent. In the same way,
given a class 1 equilibrium, it is possible to construct an outcome-equivalent class 0
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4. Omitted.
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